

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

USAREUR 2010: HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

by

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ABSTRACT

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NATO's enlargement in the post-Cold War era has fundamentally altered the political and military realities of the security structure that kept peace in Europe for over half a century. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 and the upcoming inclusion of seven new members in 2004, have created both new challenges and increased opportunities for U.S. policy in the region. More nebulous objectives including protection of human rights, combating terrorism, ensuring peace and stability, and preparing expeditionary forces for use outside of NATO territory have replaced the *raison d'être* of the alliance before 1989, to deter the expansion of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, NATO consensus in any given crisis is problematical, as has been demonstrated in recent alliance disunity over policy towards Iraq. In response, the United States has had to adapt its strategy to take into account the shifting political realities engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's expansion, and the ongoing war against terrorism. The stationing of the bulk of U.S. ground forces in Germany, once mandated by the Soviet threat, is no longer a military necessity. Indeed, there are compelling reasons to move U.S. ground forces into Eastern Europe: to help local militaries reach NATO interoperability standards, to stabilize new democracies, to gain better access to potential areas of instability, and to acquire improved training areas, among others. Spreading American units among several European states is also an important hedge against risk should a host nation deny the use of its infrastructure to prevent U.S. forces stationed on its territory from deploying out-of-area. However, sufficient U.S. forces must remain in Germany due to the political ramifications involved in any apparent move to abandon this long-time ally, which would inevitably lead to increased bilateral Franco-German security cooperation and potentially sow the seeds of NATO's dissolution. As a logical extension of NATO enlargement, the United States should station ground forces in Eastern Europe to serve better the needs of U.S. policy in the region. Poland's situation makes it the best choice to accept U.S. units immediately; Romania would be a potential candidate to receive American forces in the longer term. Such a restructuring would position the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) for more effective engagement in the area of greatest need for decades to come.

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USAREUR 2010: HARNESSING THE POTENTIAL OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

NATO's enlargement in the post-Cold War era has fundamentally altered the political and military realities of the security structure that kept peace in Europe for over half a century. The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999 and the upcoming inclusion of seven new members in 2004, have created both new challenges and increased opportunities for U.S. policy in the region. More nebulous objectives including protection of human rights through peace operations in the Balkans, combating terrorism, ensuring peace and stability in the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe, and preparing expeditionary forces for use outside of NATO territory have replaced the *raison d'etre* of the alliance before 1989, to deter the expansion of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, NATO consensus in any given crisis is problematical, as has been demonstrated in recent alliance disunity over policy towards Iraq. In response, the United States has had to adapt its strategy to take into account shifting political realities, engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's expansion, and the ongoing war against terrorism.

The stationing of the bulk of U.S. ground forces in Germany, once mandated by the Soviet threat, is no longer a military necessity. Indeed, there are compelling reasons to move U.S. ground forces into Eastern Europe: to help local military forces reach NATO interoperability standards, to stabilize new democracies, to gain better access to potential areas of instability, and to acquire improved training areas, among others. Spreading American units among several European states is also an important hedge against risk should a host nation deny the use of its infrastructure to prevent U.S. forces stationed on its territory from deploying out-of-area. Although the United States should not transfer all its ground forces out of Germany, one division would be sufficient to support U.S. policy in Western Europe.¹ America's objectives have evolved considerably from the early days of the alliance, when they were, according to Hastings Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary-General, "To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." As a logical extension of NATO enlargement, the United States should station ground forces in Eastern Europe to serve better the needs of U.S. policy in the region. Poland's situation makes it the best choice to accept U.S. units immediately; Romania would be a potential candidate to receive American forces in the longer term. Such a restructuring would position the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) for more effective engagement in the area of greatest need for decades to come.

NATO ENLARGEMENT – A POLITICAL IMPERATIVE

NATO enlargement has led to a defining moment in American foreign policy. The Clinton administration initiated NATO's first post-Cold War expansion, which brought Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance, under the national security strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.² The Bush administration's recently released national security strategy maintains the policy of expanding NATO to include the newly democratized nations of east and southeast Europe.³ NATO extended invitations to join the alliance to a second round of seven nations (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) at the Prague summit in November 2002. The necessities of the war on terrorism and evolving political, economic, and military structures in Europe have, however, created conditions for the exploration of other options. If U.S. policy must rest on assembling coalitions of the willing and able as circumstances dictate, then one alternative would be the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and the handover of European security matters to the members of the European Union under the auspices of the European Security and Defense Policy.⁴ On the other hand, the United States could embrace a multitude of overlapping regional organizations in Europe with a view towards their rapid and broad expansion. Never before in alliance history have the choices been more varied, or the ramifications more important for the future security policy of the United States.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 potentially signaled NATO's final chapter. With the Warsaw Pact's dissolution, NATO's founding purpose – to contain the Soviet Union and prevent communism's spread into Western Europe – no longer existed. To maintain the alliance in these altered circumstances, the Clinton administration sought to expand NATO. In 1997, the North Atlantic Council extended offers of membership to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The U.S. Department of State promulgated four justifications for that initiative:

- Enlargement would make NATO stronger and better able to achieve collective defense since the burden would be shared among more states.
- Enlargement would increase the alliance's military capabilities by the addition of 200,000 Polish, Czech, and Hungarian troops.
- Enlargement would bolster stability and democracy in Central Europe.
- Enlargement would erase the Cold War's artificial dividing line.⁵

In fact, the resources necessary to defend NATO's new members, should that become necessary, would dwarf any military potential they might have brought into the alliance. Their

armed forces largely consist of conscripts, with outdated Soviet equipment and little, if any, expeditionary capabilities. As one authority on NATO has stated, “Until interoperability and modernization problems are improved, new members’ value to collective defense and the new missions will remain dubious for some time. Increased membership does not equate to increased combat effectiveness, and a collection of disparate units does not make a cohesive force.”⁶ One must conclude that ultimately the reasons for NATO enlargement have always been political: to strengthen the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe and demolish the Iron Curtain.⁷

In defense of the Clinton administration’s policy of engagement and enlargement, these political objectives still apply and, given the current military and economic weakness of Russia as well as its lack of territorial ambition, are obtainable with a minimal additional U.S. military commitment. NATO enlargement has kept the alliance viable by making it relevant to European security in the post-Cold War era. As a proven commodity, NATO remains a force for stability. NATO also possesses the ability to adapt to the post-Cold War situation more quickly than other organizations such as the European Union (EU). “Extending the EU will help integrate the entire European continent, but EU enlargement also requires current and new members to make vast and complex adjustments in their regulatory regimes,” the U.S. Department of State contends. “If NATO enlargement can proceed more quickly, why wait to further integrate Europe until tomato farmers in Central Europe start using the right kind of pesticide?”⁸ What is left unspoken in such an argument, however, is key. The United States has the strongest voice in NATO, while it has none inside the European Union. Support for NATO enlargement and the continued vitality of the Euro-Atlantic alliance ensures America an enduring, preeminent role in European affairs.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 on the United States fundamentally altered America’s conceptions of security in the twenty-first century. In the new environment, NATO must contribute to the war on terrorism, or Americans will increasingly see it as irrelevant to their security. In the wake of the attacks of 9/11 the North Atlantic Council invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty to underline that the terrorist assault was an attack on all alliance members. Nevertheless, in the resulting campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO (somewhat reluctantly) stood on the sidelines. This was America’s choice, since the operations envisioned in that distant country were beyond the military capabilities of NATO allies that had done little to modernize their forces in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, turning the campaign in Afghanistan over to NATO would have required the achievement of consensus among eighteen disparate allies, a process that might have required months to resolve – as is

currently the case with the intense discussions surrounding a possible war with Iraq. These decisions have called into question NATO's enduring role and, barring steps by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to transform the alliance, raised serious concerns about its future.⁹

America's preeminent role in the world provides it the choice of either acting unilaterally or with coalitions of the "willing and able,"¹⁰ as it has already done in the war on terrorism. Although it currently has the political, military, and economic power to go it alone, alliances and coalitions greatly enhance America's ability to achieve its objectives by extending legitimacy, providing crucial resources such as basing and overflight rights, and sending the message that the free world remains united. NATO is the most successful alliance in history, one that has kept the peace for over half a century in an area vital to America's national interest. Only recently, it has brought stability to the turbulent Balkans and reached out to promote military cooperation with partners in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. NATO provides the United States with the strongest voice in European security affairs. Consequently, it would be unwise to allow the alliance to wither for a fleeting grasp at global hegemony. Indeed, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring NATO retains its role as the preeminent security organization in Europe, while taking care not to unnecessarily antagonize Russia. Yet the relationship with Russia, though delicate, is manageable, as the Prague summit and the mutual cooperation in the war on terrorism have underscored.¹¹

Europeans have embraced the multitude of regional organizations that currently exist in order to achieve continued peace through enhanced collective security.¹² NATO enlargement in this context builds on a web of cooperative political, economic, and security arrangements and institutions, to include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO's Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Council of Europe. NATO itself sees this cooperative approach as its core vision. Its landmark 1995 study of enlargement issues stated, "A strengthened OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], an enlarged NATO, an active NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the precursor to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] and PfP [Partnership for Peace] would, together with other fora, form complementary parts of a broad, inclusive European security architecture, supporting the objective of an undivided Europe."¹³ If fostered, collective security arrangements can maintain security and stability at a reduced cost, compared to what individual states would have to bear in acting alone. The disadvantage of enlarging NATO across the European expanse, however, is vesting decision-making authority in an increasing number of states, potentially making consensus-building more difficult, especially for controversial out-of-area operations.

Victory in the Cold War has given the West a brief window of opportunity to ensure the expansion of freedom across the European continent. The addition of the Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania into NATO brings the alliance to the edges of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Ukraine has stated its desire to join NATO in the future, without Russian objections, although it has far to go before its aspiration would represent a serious possibility.¹⁴ These are extraordinary accomplishments that the United States should continue to support. Consensus for action may be harder to reach in an enlarged NATO, but the new members will likely look to the United States as their benefactor, and thus would be more liable to support American goals within the alliance.¹⁵ Expansion eastward brings NATO forces closer to potential hot spots in critical areas such as Central Asia and the Caspian basin, while expansion in the Balkans has created strategic deployment options by rail to the borders of the Middle East. The security that NATO provides will help to ensure the stability of the newly democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe. The restructuring undertaken in these areas since 1989 – political and institutional reform, economic modernization, respect for human rights, and military transformation – will take decades, perhaps generations, to become permanent. An enlarged NATO, with the United States as its indispensable leader, will be a positive force for freedom in an undivided and democratic Europe – an enduring legacy of Allied victory in the Cold War.

THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA AND THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY ADAPTATION AGREEMENT

Although Russia has appeared ambivalent to NATO's expansion eastward, in fact it has at times vigorously opposed enlargement, albeit remained powerless to prevent it.¹⁶ NATO has attempted to placate the Russians through membership in the Partnership for Peace and the creation of a Permanent Joint Council, which has given Russia, in the words of former President Bill Clinton, "a voice, if not a veto," in alliance affairs.¹⁷ In the crisis over human rights violations in Kosovo and the resulting NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999, however, the Russians temporarily suspended their participation in the Permanent Joint Council.¹⁸ The events of September 11th, 2001 and the resulting cooperation of Russia and the United States in the war on terrorism have, however, gone far to reviving the strategic relationship between the two powers. As a result, the Permanent Joint Council has the potential to become an active forum for the discussion of mutual issues such as the war on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and peace enforcement operations in Central Asia and the Balkans.

As a result of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty limitations, the permanent stationing of U.S. forces in the former territory of the Warsaw Pact would require Russian acquiescence. The CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990, set strict numerical limits on five categories of conventional armaments – tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters – in the area between the Atlantic and the Urals. The express purpose was to prevent a surprise attack by either the Warsaw Pact or NATO on each other's territories.¹⁹ The original treaty, however, assumed that the treaty states would remain allies. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and NATO's enlargement invalidated this assumption and nullified the balancing mechanism of the treaty. As a consequence, Russia threatened to withdraw from the treaty when NATO expanded.²⁰ To address this issue, the thirty signatories to the CFE Treaty signed an adaptation agreement in Istanbul on 18 November 1999. This agreement limits the positioning of ground forces by setting national and territorial ceilings, rather than group limits, on conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.²¹ The agreement, however, has yet to come into force due to Russia's violations of the CFE Flank Agreement of 1996, which set limits on forces in territory belonging to Russia, Norway, Iceland, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russian positioning of forces in what it terms "the near abroad" and its continuing war in Chechnya will most likely prevent it from complying with its treaty obligations in the near future. For its part, NATO has been unwilling to pressure Russia into compliance, most likely to maintain Russia's connection to the CFE Treaty and its military forces thus at least under ostensible constraints.

Under the provisions of the CFE Adaptation Agreement, the national and territorial ceilings for twenty countries, including Russia and NATO's newest members, are one and the same. In effect, this requires the size of a country's armed forces to be lower than its national ceilings, if foreign forces are stationed within its borders. For Russia, long-opposed to NATO expansion, this constitutes an important limit on NATO ground forces and weapons deployed in former Warsaw Pact areas. Unless the new NATO members destroy tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces in their national forces, the treaty prohibits NATO from stationing other ground forces on their territory, except for temporary deployments associated with training or crisis response.²² Likewise, the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 committed NATO to ensuring the collective defense of new alliance members "by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."²³

For the United States to move forces permanently from Germany to these countries, therefore, would require either a reduction in their defense structure, which, given their bloated inventories of obsolete Soviet equipment, is likely, or a renegotiation of the CFE Adaptation Agreement with Russia. The latter is also possible, if NATO displayed flexibility on Russian armaments in the southern flank region. Such a *quid pro quo* would have considerable political and strategic implications. In essence, NATO would trade greater stability in Central and Eastern Europe for a freer Russian hand on its own territory. However, of other CFE Treaty signatories, only the Ukraine has restrictions on the positioning of its own forces within its borders. Allowing Russia to move forces within its national territory would merely recognize its rights as a sovereign state.

Accommodation of the stationing of U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe might not be as difficult as it seems. Given their historical baggage, both Germany and Russia share an interest in stabilizing the intervening region.²⁴ Basing U.S. forces in Poland is the surest way of accomplishing such a goal. In any case, the stationing U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe would require extensive negotiations between the United States and Russia to prevent damage to their critical strategic relationship.

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Under Article V of the Washington Treaty, NATO members must treat an attack on one member state as an attack on all. Enlargement of the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe, therefore, adds to alliance responsibilities, without necessarily adding to its capabilities. Given the current benign regional security environment, such a burden is acceptable in the short term. In the longer run, however, the creation of effective military capabilities in new member states is essential to the alliance's efficient functioning. As NATO's mission and force structure evolve to encompass expeditionary warfare, military forces of the new allies must modernize to enhance interoperability with their NATO partners. The new members must be net contributors to alliance defense, not merely recipients of a security windfall.

NATO instituted its Partnership for Peace program in 1994 to develop relations with non-NATO members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), including prospective NATO allies. Partnership for Peace played an important role in preparing the OSCE states to conduct cooperative peace enforcement and humanitarian military activities in the Balkans in the late 1990s. It strengthened the development of interoperable forces by involving partner states in planning and execution of joint peacekeeping operations and familiarizing them with alliance structures and procedures.²⁵ The Partnership for Peace

planning and review process provides a forum for the development of military restructuring plans for individual member states. The results, incorporated in partner defense plans, reflect member state individual partnership programs, which demonstrate their capabilities for potential NATO membership.²⁶ Operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo have shown the potential for effective interoperability among NATO members, new and old, and their Partnership for Peace associates. The deployment of the Implementation Force in 1996 required the establishment of reception facilities in Hungary, while forces in Bosnia included Russian, Polish and Czech combat battalions, Hungarian and Romanian engineer battalions, and smaller contingents from the Baltic states and elsewhere.²⁷

As a result of lessons learned from the initial round of NATO enlargement, the allies agreed upon a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999. The MAP defined for NATO aspirants the requirements they would need to accomplish, prior to acceptance in the alliance. The MAP refined criteria first specified by NATO's landmark 1995 study on enlargement issues. Its purpose was to prepare new members to be net contributors to the alliance's security upon entry.²⁸ Significantly, NATO accepted all but two of the states committed to the MAP at the Prague summit in November 2002.

NATO also recognized the possible need to station its forces on the territory of new member states, one of many alternatives explored in its 1995 study. Other than permanent stationing, options included prepositioning of equipment, routine and frequent rotation of forces for training, and the dual basing of air assets. "Decisions on the stationing of Allies' conventional forces on the territory of new members," the report concluded, "will have to be taken by the Alliance in the light of the benefits both to the Alliance as a whole and to particular new members, the military advantages of such a presence, the Alliance's military capacity for rapid and effective reinforcement, the views of the new members concerned, the cost of possible military options, and the wider political and strategic impact."²⁹ Given the costs associated with the other options, in practice the alliance has relied on occasional multinational training and exercises to familiarize NATO forces with the terrain and operating conditions on the territory of new members. As a result, the achievement of true interoperability has suffered and the forces of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have had difficulty integrating into the military structure of NATO. These three NATO members must address inadequate field training, lack of English language proficiency, and the doctrinal legacy of the Warsaw Pact before their armed forces can function as full alliance partners.³⁰

In assessing the costs of NATO enlargement, the Department of Defense examined both initial required capabilities in the new member states and longer term improvements in their

force structures to ensure that they were postured to meet NATO military commitments. Initial capabilities focused on low-cost, high payoff enhancements to improve interoperability, particularly in command and control networks and air control and logistics capabilities. Mature capabilities included enhanced interoperability, creation of transportation and logistics networks to accommodate NATO reinforcements, replacement of aging equipment, and restructuring of armed forces to enable them to deploy and operate in the full range of alliance missions.³¹ The creation of modernized, deployable forces in new member states would increase NATO's relevance in an uncertain world by enhancing force-projection capabilities for crisis management, peacemaking, and the war on terrorism. Regrettably, once the ink was dry on the agreement to expand the alliance, the motivation of new member states to expend the resources necessary to restructure their armed forces to achieve these goals lessened dramatically.³² If these states are to become full functioning military members of NATO in a broad array of missions to include out-of-area deployments, they will need assistance in education, training, and restructuring their forces for the future. These are precisely the areas in which the U.S. European Command, with forward stationed forces in Western Europe, is postured – albeit imperfectly – to assist.

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION IN USEUCOM

Given the political imperative of alliance enlargement, how can U.S. European Command best posture its permanently stationed ground forces to foster stability and security in the new NATO? The admission of the vast majority of Central and Eastern European nations into NATO has extended American military commitments up to the borders of the now-defunct Soviet Union, an expansion as serious in scope as the commitment of U.S. forces to the defense of Western Europe in 1951. U.S. ground forces are the most powerful tool at the disposal of the President to assure allies, deter conflict, and show the resolve of the United States to sustain its commitments to its NATO partners. Overseas bases also give temporarily deployed U.S. forces access to infrastructure in critical regions of the world and can enhance power projection in crises.³³ U.S. National Military Strategy also calls for the evolution of Theater Security Cooperation to ensure that the U.S. remains fully engaged overseas to promote interoperability with allies and coalition partners, assure access to critical strategic regions, enhance the development of professional civil-military relationships in emerging democracies, and create regional environments more conducive to U.S. interests.³⁴ The accomplishment of these tasks is important to the achievement of U.S. long-term interests in the European region.

U.S. European Command devised its strategy of Readiness and Engagement to attain U.S. military objectives in its area of responsibility.³⁵ The primary concern of U.S. European Command is to maintain the readiness of its military forces to project decisive force when and where needed. Beyond this imperative, however, U.S. European Command uses its military forces to engage in theater security cooperation activities with other NATO and Partnership for Peace forces to enhance interoperability, ensure access to critical infrastructure in key areas such as Hungary (the Balkans) and Turkey (the Middle East), create a condition of transparency in military affairs on the European continent, and demonstrate to newly emerging democracies the role of armed forces in a free society. Theater Security Cooperation covers a broad array of activities to include training exercises, conferences, and exchanges, but common to all is the imperative of face-to-face, personal interaction among participants. The recent inclusion of the Russian Federation in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility has significant implications for theater security cooperation. European security will be imperfect lacking Russian involvement in continental affairs, as has been demonstrated by the important contributions of Russian units to stability in Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result of the expansion of the area of responsibility, the demands on U.S. European Command forces to participate in engagement activities with the Russian military will increase in the near future, which will result in even more time away from home station for the soldiers and units involved.

Interoperability has been an increasingly difficult problem for NATO as U.S. forces transform, while European military capabilities have stagnated due to lack of funding since the end of the Cold War. Only half of NATO member states currently achieve the alliance benchmark of 2 percent of GDP allocated to defense spending, and only the defense budgets of Turkey, Greece, Poland, and the United States exceed 3 percent of GDP.³⁶ The problem is particularly acute in the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact, many of which are either now part of or will soon join the alliance. Theoretically, years of participation by prospective allies in the Partnership for Peace and NATO's Membership Action Plan – designed specifically to bring future members up to Western military standards – should have alleviated the greatest concerns about the capabilities of their armed forces and potential to strengthen the alliance. In fact, all of the new NATO allies are unprepared in varying degrees to conduct modern military operations in conjunction with U.S. and Western European forces.³⁷ "What is needed," writes General Frederick W. Kroesen, a former commander of USAREUR, "primarily, is recognition and support for a long-term program that will address and reconcile the dilemmas of coalition operations to assure NATO compatibility of all the forces of all of the nations of the alliance."³⁸ Given the infrequent opportunities for the new NATO partners to train with Western forces, interoperability

problems are likely persist in the future as the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe proceed slowly on the course of modernization and full integration into NATO structures.

Aside from episodic out-of-area deployments for contingency operations, the likely missions of U.S. forces in Europe over the next two decades will consist of shaping the environment through the integration of new NATO members and Partnership for Peace states, providing humanitarian assistance in the region, and participation in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.³⁹ Beyond these tasks, combined training is critical to prepare the rest of NATO for expeditionary warfare. U.S. European Command must take the lead now to ensure that NATO militaries are capable of cooperating with U.S. forces in the contemporary operating environment in the future.

These military objectives are only partially served with the current disposition of ground forces in Europe. In the absence of permanently stationed forces in the recently opened areas of Central and Eastern Europe, U.S. forces must temporarily deploy into these regions to conduct routine bilateral and multilateral exercises. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, readiness training in United States Army Europe has been hampered by increasingly restrictive policies in Germany, based entirely on environmental and political considerations rather than military necessity. Restrictions on maneuver and gunnery exercises in local training areas and at the more extensive complexes in Hohenfels and Grafenwöhr have hampered the readiness training of U.S. units since the end of the Cold War, and these restrictions are growing tighter.⁴⁰ Basing units on the territory of the new allies would alleviate these drawbacks of current force dispositions, with minimal downside in terms of readiness. Under an expeditionary posture, geographic locations such as Germany are not as important as the capability (airports and seaports) to deploy quickly. In fact, having units separated geographically can enhance deployment timelines by reducing bottlenecks at air and sea ports of debarkation. U.S. European Command should consider changes to basing if it is to achieve fully the twin aims of its theater strategy.

EFFICIENT BASING INITIATIVES IN UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE

A decade after the end of the Cold War, U.S. European Command continues to endeavor to close and consolidate installations throughout its theater. Simply put, the poor facilities used by U.S. forces in much of Germany – many of World War II vintage –are not cost effective. Furthermore, while modern U.S. forces languish in dilapidated bases that in many cases struggle to meet basic needs (such as paved motor pools with adequate heating, lighting, and overhead lift), the host nation forces of the Bundeswehr enjoy contemporary facilities. If the

United States is to remain engaged in Europe over the long haul, then new facilities are essential. Building new facilities is less expensive in the long run than continually renovating outdated, dilapidated structures. Given this imperative, movement of U.S. forces to the territory of the new NATO allies is no more expensive than building new bases in Germany – and may be less expensive given low-priced labor and materials available in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, if the U.S. builds its new bases contiguous to available maneuver areas and gunnery ranges, rail transportation costs will be significantly reduced.

United States Army Europe developed its current Efficient Basing Initiatives with many of the above considerations in mind. These initiatives seek to consolidate brigade-sized forces at Grafenwöhr, Germany, and Vincenza, Italy – locations with excellent training facilities and well-postured for current and emerging threats in Southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. United States Army Europe's Efficient Basing South initiative consists of adding a second airborne battalion to the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy by 2004, which will provide U.S. European Command with enhanced capabilities, increased flexibility, and address the requirement for additional rapid-deployment forces in the AOR. United States Army Europe's Efficient Basing East initiative is currently in the design phase, with \$25 million already appropriated by Congress in the FY '00 Supplemental for this purpose. Efficient Basing East is an initiative to enhance readiness and gain efficiencies by consolidating a brigade combat team from 13 installations to a single location in Grafenwöhr, Germany. Doing so will facilitate command and control, lower transportation costs by eliminating the need to use rail transportation for routine gunnery qualification, improve access to training areas, and reduce annual base operations costs by up to \$39.5 million.⁴¹

U.S. European Command can apply efficient basing concepts to the transfer of U.S. forces to Central and Eastern Europe as well. While retaining U.S. forces in Germany at the excellent training facilities in Vilseck, Grafenwöhr, and Hohenfels, U.S. European Command could station brigade combat teams in Central and Eastern Europe at consolidated locations to ease command and control, increase access to superb training areas, improve cost efficiencies, and enhance quality of life for soldiers and their families. The Army has already announced the rotation of a Stryker Brigade Combat Team to Baumholder, Germany, in 2007. This would be an ideal time to consider moving instead to a base further east – to Poland.

BASING U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Two major military reasons to base American ground forces in Central and Eastern Europe are to improve the interoperability of the military forces among the newest NATO allies

and to increase the readiness of U.S. forces by taking advantage of the extensive training facilities in the area.

Alliance forces achieve interoperability primarily through joint participation in field training exercises, which familiarizes the participants with NATO planning procedures and command and control processes, while exposing individual soldiers to Western concepts such as the role of a strong noncommissioned officer corps. The former militaries of the Warsaw Pact are not familiar with Western concepts such as the military decision making process, five-paragraph field order, and troop leading procedures.⁴² Individual classroom training will not suffice to ingrain these concepts into the armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe. Practical application in a field environment must be part of the training regimen. The continuous physical presence of Western military forces in the area will allow frequent interaction among leaders and soldiers, who must overcome significant interoperability challenges before the new allies can have a substantial role in NATO operations.

Another obstacle to interoperability is the lack of English language training among the militaries of the new NATO allies. Stationing U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe will increase the exposure of regional military forces to English through daily personal contacts and mass media such as the Armed Forces Network. A by-product of this immersion will be the example set by American military personnel as to the role of the military in a free society and the importance of the safeguarding of democratic values.⁴³

U.S. forces based in Central and Eastern Europe can take advantage of the huge training areas in the region to maintain their readiness. As weapons ranges increase and forces disperse to protect themselves against massed firepower and attacks by precision weapons, the corresponding need to train across vast distances will also intensify. Existing NATO training facilities in Germany in many cases cannot accommodate the needs of American military forces and their readiness training. Accordingly, the pressure to use areas in Central and Eastern Europe for training will only increase over time as increasingly severe environmental restrictions limit the utility of existing training areas in Western Europe. While providing good stewardship of the environment, U.S. forces can still garner extensive training benefits from the use of these facilities compared to the limitations currently in force in Germany. Efforts to utilize the vast training areas of the former Warsaw Pact nations are already underway. The massive Drawsko-Pomorskie ranges in Poland have hosted brigade-level NATO exercises for six years.⁴⁴ U.S. forces permanently stationed in the country could use these areas on a routine basis, greatly enhancing their readiness while improving the interoperability of the Polish army through combined training exercises. Host countries benefit not only from increased

opportunities for interoperability training. Western armies have paid handsomely for the privilege of using host nation training facilities – an infusion of much-needed hard currency for the struggling economies of the region.⁴⁵

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW NATO ALLIES

Given the limited assets of United States Army Europe, Russian and allied sensitivities, and the varying military potential and facilities of the ten new NATO members, the selection of a new host nation or nations in which to station American forces is a delicate and complicated matter. Criteria for selection should include access to airports and seaports for strategic lift, the military potential of the host nation armed forces, quality of host nation facilities (training areas, motor pools, barracks, housing, etc.), and access to areas of strategic concern (Balkans, Middle East, Caspian basin, and the Mediterranean littoral). Of paramount concern, of course, is the host nation's attitude towards the stationing of American troops on its territory – critical to ensuring public support for any potential out-of-area deployments.

U.S. forces based in Central and Eastern Europe would require airports and seaports to ensure their availability for out-of-area contingency operations. Ideally, airports need to be capable of handling the largest U.S. cargo aircraft, the C-5 galaxy, with its fully-loaded take-off distance of 3,720 meters. Poland has international airports at Warsaw (Okecie airport) and Krakow (Balice airport) that meet the needs of the C-5, along with major seaports along the Baltic Sea coast at Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin.⁴⁶ Romania has a large international airport (Otopeni airport) in the capital city of Bucharest that meets the needs of the C-5, along with seaports along the Black Sea coast at Constanta, Mangalia, and Sulina.⁴⁷ In Hungary, Budapest (Ferihegy airport) meets the needs of the C-5, although forces would have to travel by road or rail outside the country to ocean-going ports (travel down the Danube River by barge is possible). The Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic States have no airports capable of meeting the needs of the C-5.

Of the new NATO allies, Poland has by far the largest and most useful training areas. Poland has two large training areas of 109,000 acres at Drawsko-Pomorskie and Zagan, each of which can easily accommodate brigade-level maneuvers.⁴⁸ The Polish government has been forthcoming in allowing NATO forces to use these facilities to conduct large-scale training that is not possible in the more crowded and controlled conditions existing in Western Europe. Furthermore, Polish forces already routinely train with American and Western European militaries in large-scale exercises such as "Victory Strike."

There is a vast difference in the military potential among the ten new members of NATO. Only half of these states currently meet the NATO defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of gross domestic product, although to be fair, many current NATO allies also fail to meet the standard as well. The table details the defense expenditures of the new allies, along with the strength of their armed forces and inventory of armored vehicles and artillery (figures current as of 2000).⁴⁹ Clearly, basing a U.S. brigade in the Baltic States or Slovenia would dwarf the capabilities of those countries in military terms. On the other hand, an American unit stationed in Poland, Romania, or Bulgaria could be of great value in assisting the armed forces of those nations to meet NATO interoperability standards through frequent training exercises and other interaction.

	Defense Expenditure (US \$Million)	Expenditure as % of GDP	Armed Forces Strength	Armored Vehicles	Artillery
Bulgaria	324	2.65	75,900	5,458	1,858
Czech Rep.	1270	1.99	58,200	2,289	675
Estonia	84	1.60	4,800	39	19
Hungary	698	1.49	55,757	2,001	613
Latvia	170	1.05	3,360	15	26
Lithuania	183	1.70	10,771	105	0
Poland	3600	3.60	240,650	4,583	1,350
Romania	707	2.10	172,000	2,775	1,031
Slovakia	311	2.06	42,880	1,452	363
Slovenia	300	1.55	9,820	178	66

MILITARY STRENGTH OF NEW NATO MEMBER STATES

The second round of NATO expansion has created an alliance “land bridge” to Turkey and the Middle East, along with greater access to the Balkans and the Caspian basin. The inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria postures NATO for increased access to these areas. Although economic problems and the difficulties of defense reform will prevent these two nations from realizing an adequate (by NATO standards) military potential in this decade, in the longer term they may be of great value to alliance activities along NATO’s southern rim.⁵⁰ Given

its strategic position, large military force, and useful strategic transportation nodes, Romania would be a logical country in which to base a U.S. brigade in the more distant future.

Of the new NATO allies, Poland exhibits by far the most consistent support for its military forces. Despite universal conscription for all males and heavy defense expenditures to replace outdated Warsaw Pact equipment, opinion polls show the Polish armed forces regularly enjoying more popularity than even the Catholic church.⁵¹ U.S. forces based in Poland would receive a large degree of support given the importance that the Polish people place on defense issues and their role in NATO, not to mention the economic boost that would naturally follow the infusion of American currency into the Polish economy. One recent poll asked the Polish people to name countries they consider as “friends.” Fully 50 percent put the United States at the top of the list.⁵² As for their acceptance to the idea of stationing U.S. forces in Poland, one poll showed a 72 percent approval rating, another and impressive 89 percent.⁵³

THE ARGUMENT FOR POLAND

Given the size of its armed forces, government support of military spending and reform, and its central position between Germany and Russia, Poland is the most important of the new NATO allies. While similar in size to Spain, Poland will soon dwarf most other NATO allies (new or old) in strategic importance and military contributions to the alliance. In 1997 Poland embarked on a 15 year modernization plan, focused on improving personnel and equipment earmarked for NATO’s rapid reaction forces. The plan consisted of reducing army strength from 220,000 to 180,000 soldiers, shortening conscription to 12 months, and providing a stable defense budget pegged at 2.4 percent of GDP.⁵⁴ That same year Poland was the single largest contributor to United Nations Peacekeeping forces worldwide.⁵⁵ One commentator concludes:

Few experts doubt Poland’s ability and determination to become a valuable and salient member of the Alliance, given also the very high level of Polish public support and readiness to bear increased defense spending. The Czech Republic and Hungary are in a different league – further behind the NATO targets, with a weaker public support and shakier government determination to reach the targets of military modernization.⁵⁶

Given increased U.S. assistance in the form of a useful and visible presence in the country, Poland has the capability of becoming one of America’s most valuable allies in operations not

just in Europe, but given its demonstrated commitment to peacekeeping operations, worldwide as well.

There is much work to be done, however. The intellectual legacies of Soviet rule will provide intractable barriers to military reform, a struggle that may take generations to resolve.⁵⁷ One of the major weaknesses of Central and East European militaries, for instance, is the lack of a capable and credible noncommissioned officer corps. The new NATO allies require Western assistance to develop noncommissioned training and education systems. Although all Central and Eastern European countries have leveraged Partnership for Peace training to improve their militaries, proficiency has not yet reached NATO standards. Even the most competent military organizations have barely adequate capabilities to operate in conjunction with NATO forces at both unit level and in higher level staffs.⁵⁸ Poland, for instance, keeps its forces earmarked for NATO at higher readiness to facilitate their participation in exercises, peacekeeping, and operations only by stripping resources from the remainder of its forces. David Glantz, one of the foremost experts on the capabilities of Central and Eastern Europe militaries, concludes, "The most critical training need is for greater US-partner training cooperation aimed at promoting greater interoperability between [sic] NATO, U.S., and partner country forces."⁵⁹ Exercises are the most valuable dimension of U.S. training assistance to the new NATO allies, but lack of units and increased operating tempo for contingency operations have limited the number conducted in recent years. "It is clear that the U.S. will have to increase exercise program resources if the program is to satisfy its full potential" Glantz concludes. "If not, the program will shrink, and the U.S. will have lost the benefits of one of its premier and most valuable engagement tools."⁶⁰

President Bush and President Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland have begun the process of fostering closer military ties between their two countries. In a recent state visit in June 2002, the two leaders launched a U.S. – Poland military cooperation initiative. The initiative reflects the strategic importance of the Polish-American relationship and recognizes the critical role the U.S. must play in shaping Polish military transformation. A Military Cooperation Working Group is currently assessing options, which will include enhanced unit partnerships between U.S. Army Europe units and selected Polish units, among other potential projects.⁶¹ This forum provides an opportunity to discuss what could become the most valuable military cooperation project in Eastern Europe – the stationing of a U.S. ground brigade in Poland.

While an expensive proposition, the United States would not have to pay the entire cost of relocating a ground brigade in Poland. NATO's infrastructure budget, known as the NATO Security Investment Program, allows the alliance to underwrite the cost of support facilities. The

NATO Security Investment Program funds operational facilities in the fulfillment NATO commitments that exceed a country's national defense requirements. All U.S. operational facilities in Europe are part of the American contribution to NATO; therefore, they are all eligible for NATO Security Investment Program funding. The U.S. share of these costs is 25 percent.⁶² To reduce costs, the U.S. Army could implement a unit rotation system to its Polish base, which would eliminate the need to build family housing and support facilities in the area. This option is contingent upon a larger reform of the U.S. Army personnel system, however, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

CONCLUSION

In the altered landscape of post-Cold War Europe, the inclusion of ten new nations of Central and Eastern Europe in NATO is a watershed event that has critical political and security implications for the future of the alliance. As NATO's mission and center of gravity have shifted, so must U.S. forces in Europe adapt their engagement strategy to take into account the shifting political realities on the continent. A vital need is for the United States and its Western European allies to assist the new NATO members in becoming significant partners in a military sense to match the current political rhetoric that has so far been the sole *de facto* justification for alliance expansion. To this end, stationing U.S. ground brigades in Central and Eastern Europe would help bring local military forces up to NATO training and interoperability standards, stabilize still-fragile democracies, provide an economic boost to nascent market economies, position U.S. forces in proximity to potential areas of instability, and provide access to excellent training areas. In the next decade, Poland is the logical choice to accept stationing of a U.S. ground brigade due to its strategic position between Germany and Russia, excellent training facilities, air and sea ports, military significance, and public support for defense. In the longer term, Romania might be a candidate for stationing of a U.S. ground brigade, which could have the beneficial effect of accelerating that country's defense reforms. Both of these nations would view a U.S. presence on their territory as a valuable symbol of solidarity, one that will reap dividends in the future as the United States seeks reliable partners for operations around the world.

A revised basing plan, building upon the Efficient Basing Initiatives already in progress, will position U.S. Army Europe for effective engagement in Europe for decades to come. To make this imperative a reality, the following recommendations are proposed:

- U.S. European Command should work through the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to convene an Interagency Policy Coordination Committee to design a politico-military plan to address issues concerning basing of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe. The result should be a diplomatic plan to convince NATO of the benefits of stationing a U.S. brigade in Poland, while alleviating any Russian concerns.
- U.S. European Command, under the auspices of the State Department and Department of Defense, should coordinate with the Polish government to survey potential areas in which to station a U.S. brigade, to include air and sea ports available for use during contingency operations, with a follow-on study to be conducted in Romania.
- Commander, U.S. European Command should work through the Office of the Secretary of Defense to submit testimony to Congress regarding the benefits and long-term cost-effectiveness of basing a U.S. brigade in Poland. This is crucial since Congress must approve any funding for the facilities necessary to make such a move a reality.
- U.S. European Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of the Army should leverage the movement of a Stryker brigade to Europe in 2007 to convince Congress to approve funding now for construction of new facilities in Poland, rather than stationing the brigade in the currently planned location (Baumholder).

Stationing of a U.S. brigade in Poland will enhance NATO and U.S. military readiness while promoting greater reforms in the militaries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is a project worth pursuing today for the dividends it will pay well into the future.

Europe is at peace today, but one should not be under any illusion that the condition is a permanent one. The power and influence of the United States in European affairs has suppressed national rivalry and hostilities in the region, but absent American involvement, great power competition would sooner or later resume in unchecked fashion. The enlargement of NATO has brought more nations than ever before into a common security alliance that has provided a forum for resolving disagreements and fashioning a mutual defense policy to keep the continent at peace. To remain a functioning alliance, however, NATO must adapt to the security needs of the 21st century, or it will be seen as irrelevant and wither into insignificance. NATO must ensure that all members become net contributors to alliance needs, not just consumers of a free security umbrella. Either the U.S. and its European allies assist the new NATO allies in becoming militarily relevant, or they will watch the alliance atrophy into a genteel club where talk is more important than action. Stationing of U.S. forces on the territory of the

new allies is a key action that will prevent degradation of the alliance. Failure to act will result in a squandered opportunity to solidify the victory won at so great a cost during the Cold War.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Sufficient U.S. forces must remain in Germany due to the political ramifications involved in any apparent move to abandon this long-time ally, which would inevitably lead to increased bilateral Franco-German security cooperation and potentially sow the seeds of NATO's dissolution.

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⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement," 19 February 1998, available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_980219_natoqanda.html>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002; idem, "Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications," 24 February 1997, available from <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

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⁷ Stephen J. Blank, ed., *European Security after NATO Enlargement: A View from Central Europe* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 14; Anonymous, "The Politics of European Enlargement: NATO, the EU, and the New U.S.-European Relationship," *World Affairs* (Spring 2002): 195.

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⁹ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO and the War on Terrorism: A Changing Alliance," *The Brookings Review* 20, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 36.

¹⁰ The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, 25.

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¹³ NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," September 1995, available from <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

¹⁴ Oleg Varfolomeyev, "Ukraine Turns to NATO," *Time Europe* (20 June 2002) [journal on-line], available from <<http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/daily/0,13716,264234,00.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 October 2002.

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¹⁶ See, for instance, the arguments in Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "The Expansion of NATO in the Context of Global Politics," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 61-68.

¹⁷ "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," available from <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/founding_act>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

¹⁸ Jeffrey Tayler, "The Next Threat to NATO," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 289, no. 2 (February 2002): 69-72.

¹⁹ U.S. Mission to NATO, "Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty," available from <<http://www.nato.int/usa/info/cfe.html>>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2002.

²⁰ Adam Boger, "Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion," *The Defense Monitor*, XXIX, no. 10 (December 2000): 1.

²¹ Given the inherent mobility of combat aircraft and attack helicopters, NATO rejected Russian efforts to impose territorial limits on these weapons. Wade Boese, "Executive Summary of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty," *Arms Control Today* (November 1999) [journal on-line], available from <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_11/wbno99.asp>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2002.

²² Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," 19 November 1999, available from <<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/cfe/cfeagree.htm>>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2002. The adapted treaty allows countries to host temporary deployments that exceed their territorial limits by up to 153 tanks, 241 armored combat vehicles, and 140 artillery pieces. In exceptional circumstances (during a crisis), those states outside the CFE Treaty flank zone may exceed their limits by up to 459 tanks, 723 armored combat vehicles, and 420 artillery pieces.

²³ "Founding Act," section IV.

²⁴ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 151.

²⁵ Jonathan Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, 25.

²⁶ NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," chapter 3.

²⁷ George A. Joulwan, "NATO and the New SHAPE," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, 20.

²⁸ Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement: Crossing the Rubicon," in *NATO after Fifty Years*, ed. S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 134.

²⁹ NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," chapter 4.

³⁰ Raymond A. Millen, *Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 12.

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³³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "National Military Strategy of the United States of America," Pre-Decisional Draft, 19 September 2002, 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

³⁵ USEUCOM, "Strategy of Readiness and Engagement," available from <<http://www.eucom.mil/strategy/readiness.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

³⁶ Millen, *Tweaking NATO*, 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 10-12.

³⁸ Frederick W. Kroesen, "The Military Aspects of NATO Expansion," in *NATO after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces*, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 56.

³⁹ Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 135.

⁴⁰ Some examples of current training restrictions in Germany include the inability to conduct routine gunnery training on weekends or during early morning hours (which limits much-needed night training), exorbitant fines levied for maneuver damage, severe restrictions against low-flying aircraft (which limits close air support training), and undersized local training areas that do not allow for effective collective training at company/team level and above.

⁴¹ Congress, House of Representatives, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Military Construction, Testimony of General Joseph W. Ralston, U.S. Air Force, Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, 14 February 2002.

⁴² Millen, *Tweaking NATO*, 21.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

⁴⁴ Bob Morrison, "Strong Resolve 2002," *ETS News* [journal on-line], available from <<http://www.ets-news.com/resolve.htm>>; Internet; accessed 23 September 2002.

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⁴⁷ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: The Balkans* (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 2001), 472-473.

⁴⁸ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Central Europe & the Baltic States* 312.

⁴⁹ Data current as of 2000 and extracted from Jane's Information Group, *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Central Europe & the Baltic States* and *idem, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: The Balkans*.

⁵⁰ For the challenges of defense reform in Bulgaria and Romania, see *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: The Balkans*, 115, 458-459.

⁵¹ *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Central Europe & the Baltic States* 283.

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⁵⁸ Ibid., 28.

⁵⁹ Idem, "The Accomplishments, Strengths and Weaknesses of the U.S. Military (Security) Assistance Program," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 11, no. 4 (December 1998): 16-17.

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